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Market Forces, Institutions, 
and Inflation 
Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
During the 1970s, Italy experienced an impressive compression of wage differ- 
entials, similar to the better-known situation in Sweden. Most evidence sug- 
gests that this compression came to a stop around 1982-83,  coincident with a 
major institutional change (in the form of the escalator clause in Italian union 
contracts), a major economic change (the slowdown in inflation), a major tech- 
nological change (industrial restructuring and the computer revolution), and a 
major political change (the loss of support for unions and their egalitarian pay 
policies). There is some slight evidence of a reopening of differentials since 
then, but the evidence is uneven, and, even where a reopening is apparent, the 
degree of  inequality is still generally below the level of the early- to mid- 
1970s. 
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of wage differentials across skill and 
occupation levels and individual characteristics in Italy for workers employed 
in the regular sector of the economy: workers who are not self-employed, have 
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“above-ground” jobs, and are not covered by  special low-wage training con- 
tracts. The evidence that we provide is consistent with the view that unions 
were able to push for institutional reforms that compressed wage differentials 
in the 1970s and that this egalitarian trend has been only partially, if  at all, 
reversed in the 1980s.  While we cannot definitively distinguish among the rela- 
tive influences of  institutions, market forces, technology, and politics on the 
evolution of earnings inequality in Italy, our analysis of skill-level differentials 
and our comparison at the individual level with the more laissez-faire system 
of  the United States suggest that both inflation and egalitarian wage-setting 
institutions have importantly influenced Italian wage outcomes. 
In section 8.1, we describe the stylized evidence on the recent evolution of 
wage differentials across industries, occupation levels, and individuals. We 
then briefly lay out, in section 8.2, the institutional setup of wage determination 
in Italy. We  also examine the evolution of the compensation structure and its 
effects on wage differentials across skill levels in metal-manufacturing, con- 
centrating in particular on the effects of inflation. Our primary findings here 
are that the main “market” portion of wages (the individually contracted part) 
and the main “institutional” portion (the escalator payments) largely serve to 
cancel each other out but that inflation did have a significant effect on wage 
compression before 1983, less so recently. In section 8.3, we examine the de- 
terminants of annual wage and salary income and the degree of inequality at 
the individual level, comparing raw inequality and earnings regressions from 
a representative sample of Italian households with the U.S. Current Population 
Survey; we find a more compressed compensation structure in Italy along al- 
most all dimensions and a weak trend toward less inequality, in marked con- 
trast to the situation in the United States. Finally, in the concluding section, 
we examine the possible effects of this compression on self-employment, the 
underground  economy, and low-wage training contracts, three mechanisms 
that may have increased overall inequality in Italy but are not captured in our 
quantitative analysis of the regular sector of the economy. 
8.1  Raw Evidence on Italian Earnings Inequality 
The main focus of this paper is on earnings inequality across skill and occu- 
pation  categories within  sectors and across individual characteristics. First, 
however, we examine some aggregate data on differentials across sectors. Fig- 
ure 8.1 displays the coefficient of variation of blue-collar hourly wages across 
industries from 1974 to 1985 (after which the series was discontinued). The 
figure indicates a clear compression of differentials until 1982; after 1982, the 
dispersion of blue-collar wages increased somewhat but remained below its 
1974 level in 1985. Again, this measure of inequality is not our primary inter- 
est, but it goes back the furthest and is consistent with the view that differen- 
tials have not significantly widened recently. 
Figure 8.2 presents the ratio between average white-collar and average blue- 267  Wage Differentials in Italy 
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Fig. 8.1  Dispersion of blue-collar  hourly wages across industries 
Source: Ministry of Labor. 
collar monthly wages within the metal-manufacturing sector. Two  series are 
presented here: the Assolombarda series, consisting of  metal-manufacturing 
firms in the Milan area, and the Federmeccanica series, consisting of  metal- 
manufacturing firms nationwide.' Once again, we  observe an unambiguous 
compression until 1983, followed by no clear trend in the Assolombarda series 
and some evidence of a widening of differentials in the Federmeccanica series, 
but not to the level of the mid-1970s by the beginning of the 1990s. 
Finally, table 8.1 displays the standard deviation of the logarithm of annual 
earnings from employment from a survey conducted for the Bank of Italy over 
the period  1977-87  (excluding 1981 and  1985).' At this individual level, we 
find a continuing downward trend in inequality; in section 8.3 below, we ana- 
lyze this downward trend and the determinants of individual labor income. 
Overall, then, we do not see a clear trend toward a significant widening of 
wage inequality in these findings, although the aggregate evidence does seem 
to indicate a leveling off  of  wage compression around 1982-83.  In the next 
section, we will see what the institutional setup of  wage determination can tell 
us about the trends that we observe here. 
1. These data sets have been previously analyzed in ASAP (1986-91)  and Camiti Commission 
(1988). They are described in greater detail in the data appendix, along with the other data sets 
used in this paper. 
2. The number given is the standard deviation of the log of eamings from employment for full- 
time, full-year, nonagricultural,  non-self-employed workers between  the ages of  eighteen  and 
sixty-five. This data set is further explained and analyzed in sec. 8.3 below and in the data ap- 
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Fig. 8.2  White-collarhlue-collar  monthly wage differential in metal- 
manufacturing 
Sources; Assolombarda, Milan; Federmeccanica, nationwide. 
Nore: The Federmeccanica data refer to December in each year. 
8.2  Institutional Framework and Wage Differentials: 
Descriptive Evidence from the Metal-Manufacturing Sector 
8.2.1  The Actors 
Three major unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL) have represented workers in Italy 
during the postwar peri~d.~  These unions had their origins at the beginning of 
the cold war with the splitting of  a unified union under government and U.S. 
pressures  aimed  at isolating the Italian  Communist Party  (PCI). The three 
unions were initially, and to some extent still are, characterized by  different 
political inspirations, more or less related to the three main strains of  Italian 
politics:  Communist, Christian  Democratic,  and Social Democratic, respec- 
tively. The political pressures to split the Italian labor movement were, how- 
ever, not entirely  successful, given that,  after a decade and for most of  the 
remaining postwar period, the three unions have acted together, following a 
unified strategy, particularly in pursuing egalitarian compensation policies. As 
we shall see below, it is only recently that they have disagreed on some major 
substantive issues, in particular on the reform of the indexation system. 
It should be noted that CGIL, CISL, and UIL are confederations of sectoral 
unions. The extent to which bargaining strategies are coordinated across sec- 
tors is not, however, immediately clear. Yet some sectors seem to have played 
a leading role in the bargaining process; this is particularly true for the metal- 
manufacturing sector, on which we focus our analysis in this section. Contracts 
3. For more extensive English-language analysis of Italian industrial relations history and stmc- 
ture, see Neufeld (1960), Giugni (1984), and Locke (1992). 269  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Table 8.1  Dispersion of Individual Annual Labor Income 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1982  1983  1984  1986  1987 
SD of logarithms  .46  .44  .44  .41  .42  .41  .39  .38  .37 
Source: Bank of Italy. 
in metal-manufacturing  cover a vast array of  industries,  including all metal 
transformation activities: industrial, electrical, and transportation machinery, 
computers, other precision instruments, and several smaller metal and machin- 
ery ind~stries.~  Unions have traditionally had their strongholds in these indus- 
tries, and, therefore, metal-manufacturing contracts have often been the first to 
introduce significant pro-worker  rules  later extended  to  other  sectoral bar- 
gaining units. On a few occasions, metal-manufacturing  contracts have even 
been translated into law. 
All  private  industrial  employers  are represented by  a  single  association 
(Confindustria) that has traditionally  played the leading  role  in bargaining. 
Other similar associations represent employers in the other main sectors (trade, 
other services, artisans, agriculture), and an important role is also played by 
the association of companies that are partially owned by the government (Par- 
tecipazioni Statali) but operate under market rules. Finally, the role of the pub- 
lic administration as an employer has become increasingly important, particu- 
larly in recent years, during which, in contrast to the past, industrial relations 
outcomes in the public sector have started to influence the private ~ector.~ 
The relative strength of  workers’ unions and employers’ associations and 
the extent to which they have been able to achieve their bargaining goals have 
gone through quite substantial swings in the postwar period; we identify three 
major phases here. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of relative weakness for 
unions, although some initial steps were undertaken toward the construction 
of the strongly pro-worker legislation that now characterizes Italian industrial 
relations6  The Autunno Culdo (Hot Autumn) of  1969 was the first important 
turning point: a period of widespread social unrest and acute class conflict that 
gave unions enormous popular support and bargaining power. The result was a 
tremendous pro-worker shift in legislation and bargaining outcomes: the most 
important example is the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Charter of workers rights) that 
4. Metal-manufacturing  workers  accounted  for  approximately  one-third  of  all  non-self- 
employed industrial workers and one-tenth of all non-self-employed workers in 1990; we say ap- 
proximately because it is not possible to know exactly how many workers are covered by the terms 
of the metal-manufacturing contract. Metal-manufacturing production accounted for 38 percent 
of total industrial production. Source: Confindustria. 
5.  Particularly important was the wave of contract renewals in public administration in the late 
1980s that granted large wage increases to public-sector workers and apparently caused a ratchet 
effect on private-sector workers. 
6.  For example, laws on layoffs and firing, on the protection of female workers, and on the 
prohibition of gender- and region-based contractual pay differences. 270  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
provided the world-famous Italian workers’ protection against firing as well as 
other significant labor market regulations that heavily constrained the freedom 
of employers in the labor market. 
During the 1970s, the achievement of an egalitarian distribution of income 
was one of  the focal objectives of  unions, and, given their relative strength 
during this period, they were able to induce a strong compression of  wage 
differentials. Several collective contracts in the early 1970s granted equal con- 
tractual increases to all workers, and in  1975 a new  indexation  system, to 
which we  return below, provided for equal increases to all workers for each 
percentage point of inflation. The slogan “equal pay for all work” would have 
been subscribed to by most union leaders during this period, and it is difficult 
to doubt that a large part of the compression of wage differentials observed in 
the 1970s (discussed above) was caused by  the unions’ successful pursuit of 
egalitarian pay policies. 
The march against unions by forty-thousand high-level white-collar workers 
in Turin (the location of Fiat) in the fall of 1980 may be considered the second 
turning point. The compression of  wage differentials had reached a threshold 
of unacceptability for high-skilled workers, and their opposition to egalitarian- 
ism, probably latent in the previous years, came explicitly to the surface. In the 
meantime, the process of heavy plant restructuring, spurred by  the oil shocks 
and begun  in the late  1970s, had extended to a large part of  the industrial 
sector, resulting in major layoffs in the industrialized regions. The unions pro- 
gressively began to lose members and public support, owing in no small mea- 
sure to their inability to protect less skilled workers from layoffs and the oppo- 
sition of the highly skilled workers to egalitarianism. 
Table 8.2 presents some illustrative figures on this recent diminution of 
union strength. The first two columns report measures of strike activity for the 
national industrial sector and for the Lombardy metal-manufacturing sector, 
respectively: both series display a significant decrease in the number of hours 
lost to labor conflicts after 1983.7 The last column reports union membership 
for the metal-manufacturing sector in the Milan area. Different definitions of 
Milan area  in the publications from which these numbers were taken cast 
doubt on the exact comparability of these numbers across years. We are, never- 
theless, confident about the basic message that can be taken from this column: 
union membership has been steadily falling since the mid-l970s, with a sig- 
nificant drop at the beginning of the 1980s. 
The result of  these trends was a loss of bargaining power from which the 
three traditional major unions do not seem to have  recovered. Furthermore, 
7. An additional interesting fact concerning the significant reduction of strike activity in  1978 
is that that was the year of the kidnapping of the Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by the 
Red Brigades. A government of national solidarity against terrorism and the economic crisis, with 
the external support of the PCI, was put in power on that occasion. The general feeling of national 
solidarity against the Red Brigades, shared by the PCI, contributed to the decrease in strike ac- 
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Table 8.2  Labor Conflicts and Union Membership, 1974-90 
Total Number of Hours  CGIL, CISL, and UIL 
Average Number of Hours  Lost to Strikes per Year  Members 
Lost to Strikes per Month  (metal-manufacturing,  (metal-manufacturing, 

































































Source: These data were collected at the FLM historical archive in Milan 
‘Average of the January, April, July, and October number of hours lost to strikes in millions, from 
the Bank of  Italy. 
Total number of  hours lost in each year in thousands, from the Instituto Nationale di Statistica’s 
Annuario di statistiche del lavoro. 
‘Number of members of the FLM (federation  of metal-manufacturing workers); this is the confed- 
eration that jointly organizes CGIL, CISL, and UIL workers in metal-manufacturing. 
new corporative unions representing small groups of workers in crucial posi- 
tions have  acquired substantial power, particularly in public-sector services, 
exacerbating the current weakness of  the traditional Italian labor movement. 
All this adds up to a labor movement with a diminished ability (and perhaps 
willingness) to push through egalitarian pay policies. 
8.2.2  The Bargaining Structure and the Inquadrumento 
On the basis of  an extensive interpretation of  the Constitution, and in the 
absence of  rules concerning unions’ certification, collective contracts signed 
by  the three main unions have erga omnes validity as far as compensation is 
concerned (i.e., they apply to all workers regardless of  union status).8  There- 
fore, in Italy, union membership may differ dramatically from union coverage: 
the latter is always virtually 100 percent within each unit for which a collective 
8.  The  literature on the Italian bargaining structure and on the inquadramento  is large; we draw 
in particular on Carinci (1987) and Ichino (1992). 272  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
contract is signed. Furthermore, collective contracts have on a few occasions 
been translated into law. Hence, the influence of unions has reached those parts 
of the economy that the unions have not directly organized. 
Bargaining takes place at the national, sectoral, provincial, and firm levels. 
Essentially, all aspects of labor relations may be a subject of negotiations, as 
long as the bargaining outcome is at least as favorable for the workers as what 
is implied by  the law.  Bargaining at the national or provincial level can be 
characterized as a state-contingent process in the sense that it usually occurs 
when specific issues of general relevance need to be discussed; as far as com- 
pensation differentials are concerned, the most important issue discussed at the 
national level has been the indexation system. In contrast, sectoral and firm- 
level bargaining are better characterized as time-contingent processes. Typi- 
cally, sectoral contracts last approximately three years, and, after the signing of 
each sectoral contract, bargaining at the firm level begins. The sectoral contract 
provides a wage floor for the firm level, but bargaining does not necessarily 
occur at the firm level. Indeed, during the early 1980s, Confindustria often 
advised its members not to bargain on wages at the firm level; moreover, in 
many firms at that time unions did not have enough strength to push the discus- 
sion of wage increases beyond those granted by the sectoral contract. 
Many  of  the outcomes of  collective agreements are differentiated across 
workers according to a skill ranking system. The law  first divides non-self- 
employed workers into four categories: blue-collar workers, white-collar work- 
ers, quadri, and managers. The nature of the occupation, whether manual or 
intellectual, traces the borderline between blue-collar workers and the other 
categories, while the amount of directive responsibilities traces the distinctions 
among the higher categories. High-level white-collar workers with directive 
responsibilities, known as the quadri, were first recognized by  the law  as a 
separate category in 1985. However, after the march of the forty thousand in 
1980, collective contracts and employers acting independently from the con- 
tracts had already started to grant them some preferential treatment. The pro- 
cess that led to the recognition of the quadri as a separate category was one of 
the many signs that the compression of differentials achieved in the 1970s had 
gone too far for the unions’ constituencies and the public at large. 
Within the ranks of the nonmanagerial workers, collective contracts at the 
sectoral level  further subdivide workers into  several quasi skill categories 
called inquadramento levels. Wages  and working conditions are attached to 
these levels, and contracts establish which types of workers are in which level; 
instead of job descriptions, there are inquadramento descriptions. 
In the 1950s and 1960s,  there were different inquadramento levels for blue- 
collar and white-collar workers, while the quadri category did not yet  exist. 
The distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers was, however, in 
evident contrast to the egalitarian goals of the unions. Therefore, during their 
period of strength in the early 1970s, the unions tried to push, through collec- 
tive bargaining, for the inquadramento unico: a single ranking structure for 273  Wage Differentials in Italy 
blue-collar and white-collar workers. The goal was to make explicit the equiva- 
lence of the skill content of  manual and intellectual work. The attempt was, 
however, only partially successful, with blue- and white-collar workers ranked 
together only in the bottom half of the inquadramento and only white-collar 
workers ranked in the upper half. 
In the metal-manufacturing sector, for example, there are eight inquadra- 
mento levels9  All blue-collar workers are ranked in the first five levels; some 
blue-collar workers with directive responsibilities are called intermediates and 
are ranked in the fourth and fifth levels. White-collar workers are ranked in all 
levels but the first. Finally, the quadri are ranked in the seventh level. Thus, 
despite the egalitarian gains of the unions, it is possible to identify fifteen dif- 
ferent skill ranks of  workers in metal-manufacturing: five blue-collar levels, 
two intermediate levels, seven white-collar levels, and one level for the quadri. 
Our analysis in this section is based on the average monthly wages for these 
categories of workers for samples of firms from two data sets. The Assolomb- 
arda data set is collected by the Lombardy section of Confindustria from ques- 
tionnaires sent to metal-manufacturing firms in the Milan area. This data set 
provides fairly disaggregated information on the components of the compensa- 
tion  package.  The  Federmeccanica  data  set  is  collected  by  the  metal- 
manufacturing section of  Confindustria and is based on firms in the whole 
country, but it provides more limited information on components of the com- 
pensation package.I0 
First, we believe that it is important to get a sense of the extent of the homo- 
geneity of these fifteen categories across firms, in terms of monthly compensa- 
tion. From the Assolombarda data set, we have access to the average monthly 
wages paid by each firm to the workers in each of the fifteen categories for the 
years  1983-90.  The inquadramento level of  the workers explains approxi- 
mately 80-90  percent of the total variance of  average monthly wages across 
inquadramento  levels  and  firms.  Furthermore, the  (employment-weighted) 
within-inquadramento coefficient of  variation of the average monthly wages 
paid across the firms in the sample is never above 10 percent (i.e., the standard 
deviation is never larger than 10 percent of the mean). 
Looking separately at blue-collar and white-collar workers, there is the most 
homogeneity within the central ranks of each of the two groups. It should be 
kept in mind, however, that very few firms in the Assolombarda data set rank 
workers in the lowest blue-collar and white-collar levels, so the coefficients of 
variation are not very significant for these two levels. In the rest of our analysis 
based on the Assolombarda data set, we will drop these two  levels. Intra- 
inquadramento pay for white-collar workers seems to be on average less homo- 
geneous than for blue-collar workers, and for high white-collar levels the coef- 
9. The levels are  numbered  from  1  to 7, but  an  additional category called 5-super has been 
10. Further descriptions of these two data sets are provided in the data appendix. 
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ficient of  variation  is significantly  larger. There is, then, apparently less pay 
homogeneity across firms at high inquadramento levels. 
Since we do not have access to individual wages in these data sets, we have 
little to say  about within-firm  variability.  Limiting  ourselves to differences 
across firms, we take the above as evidence that inquadramento levels explain 
a large part of the variability of monthly compensation. In other words, work- 
ers in a given level seem to receive fairly similar wages in different firms, al- 
though this is less true the higher the skill level. If  one is willing to believe 
that wage homogeneity reflects skill homogeneity, and in the absence of better 
measures, inquadramento levels can then be considered as fairly satisfactory 
proxies for skill ranks. 
The distribution of workers across inquadramento levels has undergone in- 
teresting changes in recent years. The Federmeccanica data set contains infor- 
mation on the proportion of workers in each level that is comparable across 
years. Between  1976 and 1991, the proportion of blue-collar workers in the 
nonmanagerial metal-manufacturing labor force decreased from 75.8 to 63.5 
percent. This decrease seems to have been mainly due to a decrease in the 
proportion of workers in the three lowest inquadrumento levels;  since rela- 
tively few workers are ranked in the first two levels, most of  the decrease in 
the blue-collar fraction of  the labor force comes from the third level. As for 
white-collar workers, the increase in their proportion of the labor force is al- 
most entirely due to an increase in the proportion of workers ranked in the two 
highest levels. These trends are particularly evident between 1976 and 1987. 
This evidence suggests that the metal-manufacturing sector underwent a sig- 
nificant change  in the composition  of its labor force across inquadrumento 
levels between  1976 and 1987. There are two principal interpretations of this 
change  in composition.  First, inasmuch  as the inquadramento levels reflect 
skill levels, there may have been a shift  away  from lower skills and toward 
higher skills. Unfortunately, with our data, we have no way of measuring how 
much  of this  shift was due to labor demand  forces and how much to labor 
supply forces. 
Second, these trends may simply be the result of internal promotions during 
a period in which employment growth in the metal-manufacturing sector was 
minimal. In centralized bargaining systems, upgrading is a typical response to 
market forces pushing for more wage dispersion, resulting  ultimately  in  an 
implicit form of wage drift. Again, however, with our data we cannot disentan- 
gle the extent to which these trends in the composition of the labor force reflect 
technological shifts toward more skill-intensive production and the extent to 
which they represent a form of wage drift. While reading the succeeding sec- 
tions, however, keep in mind that, on top of the wage drift that we will explic- 
itly measure (as the non-collectively  contracted portion of the compensation 
package), wage drift is also likely to have taken place implicitly through pro- 
motions. 275  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Table 8.3  The Structure of the Typical Compensation Package 
Contractual minimum (sector) 
+ 
Scalu mobile component (sector, nation, or law) 
= Contractual compensation 
+ Collective superminimum (firm) 
+ Individual superminimum (individual) 
+ Seniority increase (sector) 
+ Production premium (sector/firm) 
= Base monthly compensation 
+ Extraordinary pay (sector, law) 
+ Overtime payments (sector, law) 
= Monthly compensation X 12 
+ 13th-14th  months, etc. (sectorflaw) 
+ Other annual bonuses (sector/finn) 
= Total annual compensation 
+ Severance pay (law) 
= Total compensation 
Note: The bargaining level at which the component is discussed, or whether it is determined by 
law, is in parentheses. 
8.2.3  The Compensation Structure and Compensation Differentials 
The structure of the typical compensation package for an Italian industrial 
worker is detailed in table 8.3.“ The contractual minimum is determined at the 
sectoral bargaining level; the indexation system (sculu mobile, “escalator”), 
regulated by  sectoral bargaining or by  law, is thought of as protection for the 
purchasing power of the contractual minimum. These two components make 
up the contractual compensation. Bargaining at the firm level adds to this floor 
a wage increase called the collective superminimum and a component called 
the production  premium; the latter component originally had an incentive func- 
tion that was abandoned in the 1970s under union pressure, although it still 
remains in the compensation package. More recently, annual bonuses, some- 
times in the form of profit sharing, and plant-level incentive components have 
also been introduced into firm-level bargaining; seniority increases, in contrast, 
have always been determined at the sectoral level. The individual supermini- 
mum is the last component of  the so-called base monthly compensation; it is 
determined by  the employer outside any direct influence by  unions-as  we 
11. The data sets on which this section is based have been used by several previous researchers. 
This section owes a great deal to that literature, particularly ASAP (1986-91),  Camiti Commission 
(1988), Biagioli (1985, 1988). Frey (1988), Bordogna (1988), and Lucifora and Presutto (1990). 276  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
will see, because of this feature, it has played a significant role in the determi- 
nation of wage differentials. 
Adding some minor extraordinary payments  and overtime payments,12 we 
get to the total monthly compensation. The annual compensation is not just 
equal to twelve monthly installments, however, because, in addition to the an- 
nual bonuses mentioned above, at least one (by law), or two, or in some cases 
up to four additional “months” are added according to the sectoral contracts. 
Finally, severance payments are granted by law in any case of job separation. 
Not all these components are equally important, particularly as far as wage 
differentials are concerned. As shown in table 8.4, the contractual minimum, 
the cumulated scala mobile  payment^,'^ and the individual superminimum ac- 
counted for between 80 and 90 percent of the total monthly wage in 1991 in 
each inquadrumento level, although their relative weights vaned, as will be 
discussed  below.  Furthermore,  because overtime  payments,  severance  pay- 
ments,  and thirteenth-month  (and  above)  installments  depend on the  base 
monthly  compensation, the  behavior  of  these  three  components essentially 
shapes the behavior of the entire compensation package. In the remainder of 
this subsection, we describe the evolution and the determinants of these three 
key components. 
The Contractual Minimum 
As previously mentioned,  the floor of the entire wage structure is the con- 
tractual minimum, established  at the sectoral bargaining  level. For each in- 
quadrumento level, and for each year  of  the  contract,  a minimum wage  is 
agreed on. As shown in table 8.4, this component amounted to approximately 
30 percent of the total monthly wage in each inquadrumento level in 1991. 
With the exception of  a few contracts in the early 1970s, contracted mini- 
mum increases  have always displayed some differentiation across inquadra- 
mento levels. Nevertheless, the compression of differentials for contracted lev- 
els continued until the end of the 1970s. For metal-manufacturing in the Milan 
area, these trends are shown in figure 8.3.14 In 1976, the contracted minimum 
for white-collar  workers  in the seventh level  was  80 percent  more than for 
blue-collar workers in the second level. This percentage fell to 60 percent in 
1979 and then grew more or less steadily up to 1991: in this year, the highest 
contracted minimum was almost twice the lowest. 
Figure 8.3 also shows the same dispersion measure for total monthly com- 
12. The minor extraordinary payments are payments for missions or compensating payments 
for specific job characteristics, e.g.  overtime payments are not included in the monthly compensa- 
tion data that we use in the rest of this section. 
13. Here and elsewhere in the figures and tables, we refer to scala mobile payments cumulated 
since 198  1. 
14. Each point in this figure represents a compensation ratio between the seventh white-collar 
level and the second blue-collar level, with the exception of the upper observations on monthly 
compensation after 1987 (see n. IS below). 277  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Table 8.4  Main Components of the Monthly Wage as a Percentage of the Total, 
Milan Area Metal-Manufacturing Sector, 1991 
Inquadramento  Contractual  Individual  Collective 
















































































pen~ation.'~  This differential is larger than the contracted one in every year and 
is U shaped, with a minimum in  1983; this minimum occurs four years after 
the minimum of  the contracted differential. In other words, despite the fact 
that contracted differentials began to widen in the late 1970s,  total differentials 
continued to compress. If the contracted minimum plus the scala mobile com- 
ponent is considered (the third series displayed in fig. 8.3), the madmin ratio 
for this series also keeps decreasing until 1983. This evidence suggests that, in 
conjunction with the indexation system, inflation bore major responsibility for 
the compression of monthly wage differentials between 1979 and 1983. 
The Scala Mobile 
Indexation has a long and  conflict-ridden history in  Italy, full of  conse- 
quences for the evolution of  wage differentials.16 The first escalator (scala 
mobile) was introduced in bargaining at the national level immediately after 
the war. For each unit increase in the price index, equal wage increases (called 
punti di contingenza = points) were paid to workers in all sectors and inquad- 
ramenro levels, but the increases were differentiated by  region (lower in the 
15. After 1987, the figure reports two max/min  rations for total compensation. The upper one 
uses the average wage of the quadri  as the mu. This should not necessarily be interpreted as a 
widening of  differentials with respect to previous years since the category of the quadri was cre- 
ated by  splitting the seventh white-collar category. As discussed above, the quadri started being 
treated differently long before this split. The figure indicates, however, that the differential treat- 
ment of the quadri,  hidden in the seventh level before 1987, was indeed significant. 
16. For additional information on the debate concerning the scala mobile and on its history, see 
D'Apice (1975), Quarchioni (1979). CNEL (1981), Alleva (1986). Faustini (1987), and Mariani 
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Fig. 8.3  Max/min ratios across inquadramento levels, Milan area metal- 
manufacturing sector 
Source: Assolombarda. 
south), gender (lower for women), and age (lower for young workers). A refer- 
ence basket of goods was established that remains essentially unchanged today. 
The agreement, initially proposed by Confindustria, was explicitly interpreted 
by the parties as an exchange of indexation for social peace. 
The provision of equal scala payments for all workers (which ensured 100 
percent coverage for the mean worker's contracted wage in  1946) clearly in- 
duced a compression of  wage differentials.  It also essentially  provided  zero 
coverage for subsequent contracted  wage  increases; yet, on the  other hand, 
since the punti di contingenza  were paid  for each unit increase in the price 
index (rather than for each percentage  point drop in the mean worker's real 
wage, e.g.), this system accelerated the reaction of wages to inflation. Such a 
system, therefore, requires periodic adjustments, first to provide coverage for 
subsequent contracted wage increases, and second to reduce the built-in accel- 
eration of the wage-price spiral. 
The compression of differentials caused by this indexation  system, in con- 
junction with the high postwar inflation, soon led to calls for the elimination 
of the egalitarian aspects of the escalator. The system was slightly changed in 
1951: the new  system was still based on points,  but the escalator increases 
were differentiated  to provide  100 percent coverage for each inquadramento 
level and  to maintain  inter-inquadramento  differentials  on a  100-239  scale 
from the lowest blue-collar level to the highest white-collar level. All other 
aspects  remained  unchanged,  including  zero coverage  for  future  wage  in- 
creases and the built-in accelerator. 
The scala mobile maintained this same basic structure until the mid- 1970s, 
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increases and to reduce the reaction speed of the escalator. One major change, 
concerning not only the indexation system but also contracted wages, was the 
elimination by law of scala mobile payments and contracted wage differentia- 
tion by  gender, age, and region. The escalator, originally introduced in bar- 
gaining, was extended by law to the entire industrial sector in 1960. With few 
exceptions (the financial sector, e.g.), it was extended through contracts to the 
rest of  the economy, although its nontrivial drawbacks in terms of  coverage 
and the wage-price spiral were already evident. 
Then, when union strength increased dramatically after the Autunno Caldo, 
the unions sought changes in the system. Most obviously, the egalitarian aspi- 
rations of the early 1970s clashed with the differentiation of scala mobile pay- 
ments across inquadramento levels; in addition, given the large contracted 
wage increases of the early 1970s, and despite the periodic readjustments, the 
coverage provided by  the system had decreased. Finally, the first appearance 
of oil shock inflation suggested to the unions the need for better protection of 
real wages. 
At the unions' request to Confindustria, a return to a fully egalitarian escala- 
tor was  negotiated in  1975: the parties agreed on a two-year transition to a 
system where all workers would receive, at a quarterly frequency, equal escala- 
tor increases for each point increase of the price index in the previous quarter 
(i.e., similar to the 1945-46 system, but without differentiation by  region, gen- 
der, and age)." The scala point was set equal to the highest point of the previ- 
ous system (upward equalization). In addition, a quite substantial fixed sum 
was paid to all workers as compensation for the lack of full coverage of interim 
wage increases under the old system. A 1977 law prohibited escalator systems 
more favorable to workers than the escalator negotiated in 1975; this implied 
de facto legal extension of the industrial sector escalator to the entire economy. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the two major drawbacks of  the previous system 
(zero coverage of  subsequent contracted increases and  acceleration of  the 
wage-price spiral) remained in place, while the potential for dramatic compres- 
sionary effects on wage differentials in a country already facing double-digit 
inflation was built in. In addition, the average coverage was dramatically raised 
by  the upward equalization of the punti, increasing real rigidities potentially 
incompatible with the consequences of the oil shocks. 
Indeed, between 1975 and 1983, while inflation fluctuated between 10 and 
20 percent (fig. 8.4), the potential for wage compression became a reality, as 
shown by  the evidence presented in the first section and in figure 8.3 above: 
the dispersion of all the measures that we consider (except the contracted mini- 
mum alone), and in particular the contracted plus scala mobile component of 
the compensation package, displays a continuing compression until 1982-83. 
17. Note the similarity of this system to the escalator clauses in many U.S. union contracts: in 
the automobile and aerospace industries, e.g., cost-of-living clauses often specify across-the-board 




Fig. 8.4  Annual inflation in Italy 
Source: Bank  of Italy. 
Despite increasing opposition by highly skilled workers to wage compression, 
unions remained attached to the egalitarian nature of  the scala mobile. They 
also opposed any attempts to cut the degree of coverage and the reaction speed 
of the escalator. 
On these latter issues, however, the three unions came to fundamental dis- 
agreement after many years of unified action. In 1983, CISL and UIL joined in 
an agreement  with employers (spearheaded  by  the  government) that imple- 
mented a 15 percent downward adjustment in the degree of coverage, followed 
in 1984 by  a predetermined cap on scala payments. The Communist majority 
within  the  CGIL opposed  the  agreements,  and  together  with  the  PCI  they 
pushed for a referendum against the 1984 agreement. The referendum, held in 
1985, acquired a political importance that went far beyond the relevance of the 
money involved: it became a referendum on the scalu mobile. The result was a 
defeat for the PCI and the CGIL that signaled the end of the old indexation 
system. 
On the wave of the referendum results, Confindustria was strong enough to 
reject the old indexation system as a whole. However, the bargaining process 
over a new system between Confindustria and the unions came to a dead end. 
The government was therefore compelled to intervene directly in order to avoid 
social unrest, doing so in  1986 with a law on indexation  that imposed a new 
public-sector  escalator on the  entire economy. The point-based  system was 
abandoned for something analogous to a progressive tax system:  100 percent 
coverage for a portion of the contracted compensation (equivalent to the con- 
tractual minimum of a medium-level worker),  with  the remainder up to the 
total contractual compensation (contractual minimum plus scala mobile: see 
table 8.3 above) indexed at 25 percent. All other compensation components 281  Wage Differentials in Italy 
were uncovered. The average overall degree of indexation was approximately 
50 percent for blue-collar workers and 40 percent for white-collar workers. 
The law expired in 1990 and was extended for one year in the hopes that the 
parties would reach a solution. In December 1991, the parties decided to sus- 
pend the existing indexation system (begun in 1986) and to open, in June 1992, 
a new bargaining round aimed at a comprehensive reform of the entire com- 
pensation system, including indexation. The trade unions, the employers, and 
the government came to a first agreement at the end of July 1992. Despite the 
strong opposition  of  the Communist left in the CGIL, the July  agreement 
brought the death of the scala mobile: in exchange for the elimination of the 
indexation  system, Italian  workers were to receive monthly lump-sum pay- 
ments beginning in January 1993 equal, for everyone, to slightly more than 1 
percent of the monthly wage of the lowest-level blue-collar worker in 1990. In 
addition, bargaining  at the firm level was suspended by  the July agreement 
until the end of  1993.18 
This agreement clearly has the flavor of a large concession from workers to 
employers, and in fact it generated much opposition among some union mem- 
bers. In addition, the subsequent exchange rate crisis of the lira, initiated in 
September 1992 and followed by a stabilization program proposed by the gov- 
ernment, made the July agreement even more difficult for the unions’ base 
constituency to accept: the devaluation generated a widespread fear of growing 
inflation in the absence of  indexation, while the stabilization program (more 
taxes and fewer social expenditures) contradicted some of the commitments 
made in July by the government. 
Returning to the 1986 reform, it apparently did not induce very much differ- 
entiation across inquadramento levels: figure 8.3 above indicates that the maxl 
min ratio of the contracted minimum plus scala mobile component increased 
only slightly in the late 1980s, although the differential for the contracted in- 
crease shows a more marked upward trend. We see in table 8.4 above that, 
in 1991, the portion of total compensation accounted for by the scala mobile 
payments cumulated since 1981 still shrinks as we move to higher inquadra- 
mento levels; during the 1980s, the indexation system did not fully protect the 
wages of highly skilled workers. Table 8.4 seems, however, to suggest that the 
third main component of the compensation package, the individual supermini- 
mum, has at least partially compensated the highly skilled workers for the low 
coverage provided by the scala mobile system. 
The Collective and the Individual Superminima 
Bargaining at the firm level has clearly influenced wage differentials. The 
main portion of the compensation package that is determined at this level is 
the collective superminimum (see table 8.3 above). The ratio between the high- 
18. As for the comprehensive discussion of the entire compensation structure, the agreement 
mentions only a generic commitment of the parties to discuss the issue in future bargaining rounds. 282  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
est and the lowest inquadramento levels for the cross-firm average of this wage 
component (from the Assolombarda data set) ranged from 233 in 1976 to 339 
in 1991, while for the contracted minimum the ratio ranged from 187 to 201 
over the same time period; however, the collective superminimum ratio is still 
relatively small if we compare it to the ratio for the individual superminimum, 
which ranged from 3,670 in 1976 to 12,708 in 1991. 
The individual superminimum is the part of the monthly wage that is deter- 
mined by the employer specifically for each worker and, therefore, is the only 
component of  the compensation package that is not regulated by collective 
bargaining or by the law. As shown in table 8.4 above, this component is practi- 
cally insignificant at low inquadramento levels but grows to almost 40 percent 
of the compensation package at the highest white-collar level. All together, this 
evidence suggests that the individual superminimum is the main instrument by 
which individual employer-worker bargaining influences wage dispersion. 
Some interesting descriptive evidence on the role of this component is pro- 
vided in table 8.5. This table, based on Federmeccanica data, displays the fol- 
lowing decomposition of the annual increase in monthly compensation: 
where WT = total monthly compensation, WCS = contracted minimum wage 
plus cumulated scala mobile, and t indexes years. That is, the total percentage 
monthly wage increase between two years can be decomposed into the sum of 
the percentage increase due to the scala mobile and the contract, plus the log 
of the ratio between the total wage and the contracted plus scala mobile por- 
tion. This last term is known in the literature as the drift rate (see, eg,  Hibbs 
and Locking 1991). Table 8.5 presents, for each inquadramento level, the aver- 
ages of  these  three  terms for the periods  1976-82  and  1983-90.  This data 
set does not offer separate information on the individual superminimum, and 
therefore we can examine only the overall drift. We know, however, from the 
evidence presented above that, as far as differentials are concerned, the individ- 
ual superminimum is the most important component of the drift. 
Looking at total  wage  growth  in  the  different  inquadramento  levels, the 
compression of wage differentials in the first subperiod and the expansion in 
the second appear evident.I9 But what is most striking in this table is the exis- 
tence of  a scissor between the drift rate and the increase due to the contract 
plus the scala mobile, which grows larger as we move across inquadramento 
levels. Notice also that, in the second subperiod, the size of the scissor clearly 
widens, particularly in the higher white-collar levels. Combining the evidence 
provided by this table and by figure 8.3 above, it seems that the disequalizing 
effect of  the drift rate became greater in the second subperiod, when inflation 
19. Keep in mind that, while white-collar inquadrumento levels are listed after blue-collar levels 
in the table, blue- and white-collar workers in the same level are comparable in terms of  the 
contracted portion of the compensation package. 283  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Table 8.5  Decomposition of the Total Monthly Wage Increase in the Nationwide 
Metal-Manufacturing  Sector 
1976-82  Averages  1983-90 Averages 
Inquadramento  Total Wage  Contract  Total Wage  Contract 
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was lower, but that this component has acted primarily to offset the equalizing 
effect of the escalator. 
8.2.4  Inflation and Wage Dispersion 
Given the evidence presented above, it can be argued that inflation affected 
wage differentials through two interrelated channels, one direct and one indi- 
rect. The direct channel worked through the egalitarian indexation mechanism 
and generated a compressionary effect on the wage distribution. The indirect 
channel worked instead through the drift: the higher inflation, the greater is 
likely to have been the extent of the use of the drift on the part of employers to 
offset the compression caused by the scala mobile; this second channel gener- 
ated an expansionary effect on the wage distribution. 
Since the  percentage  increase  in  total  wage  dispersion  is  a  function  of 
changes in the dispersion due to the escalator and to the drift, one can estimate 
the reduced-form overall effect of inflation on the change in total wage disper- 
sion and thus get a sense of which of these two channels prevailed. The results 
of this reduced-form estimation are contained in the following equation, esti- 
mated over the period 1976-90  on Federmeccanica data: 
log(vwwTflT)  = 0.19 
(0.06) 
- 1.57 *  INFLATION 
(0.41) 
+ 0.01. CONTRACT -  0.06 *  QUADRI, 
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where VWT is the variance of the log of monthly wages across inquadrumento 
levels (excluding the quudri), CONTRACT is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one in the years in which a contract is signed, and QUADRI is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one for the years in which the quadri were sepa- 
rated from the seventh white-collar level. Inflation, through the sculu mobile 
and the drift, clearly had a strong negative and significant effect on the percent- 
age change in wage dispersion. Therefore, the disequalizing effect of the wage 
drift was not strong enough to offset completely the compression of  differen- 
tials caused by the indexation system. 
On the other hand, when we distinguish between the two subperiods ana- 
lyzed in table 8.5, we obtain the following result: 
log(=)  = 0.07 -  0.96 * INFLATION1 -  0.23 - INFLATION2 
vwTr-l  (0.08)  (0.52)  (1.13) 
+ 0.03 * CONTRACT -  0.05 - QUADRI, 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
where  INFLATION1  (INFLATION2) is  equal  to  inflation  for  the  years 
1976-82  (1983-90)  and zero otherwise, and the other variables are defined as 
above. Here we  see that inflation significantly compressed wages only until 
1982. After 1982, inflation does not seem to have affected wage differentials, 
despite the persistently egalitarian nature of the escalator. This suggests that, 
in the second subperiod, the disequalizing effect of the drift became relatively 
stronger and capable of practically offsetting the effect of the escalator. 
What we have found, then, is that a large part of the compression generated 
by twenty years of inflation and egalitarian institutions seems still to be pres- 
ent. We next see what we can learn from individual data and a comparison with 
the United States, where egalitarian wage-setting institutions clearly play a 
much less significant role. 
8.3  Individual Characteristics and Earnings Inequality: 
A Comparison of Italy find the United States 
We  now turn to an analysis of individual level data on the determinants of 
annual wage and salary earnings in Italy, using the United States as a bench- 
mark. We  first describe the trends in educational attainment and the age struc- 
tures of  our samples of workers in the two countries over the period under 
study, 1978-87,  finding roughly similar age structures and a higher average 
level of educational attainment in the United States but a trend toward more 
educated workforces in both countries. We  then examine returns to schooling 
and experience and measures of overall earnings inequality in the two coun- 
tries. Our main findings here are that overall inequality and returns to skill (as 
measured by the variability of actual and residual log earnings and the return 
to a college degree) are unambiguously higher in the United States than in 285  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Italy and that, while inequality has clearly increased in the United States, the 
pattern is less clear in Italy-indicating,  if anything, a trend toward a less un- 
equal distribution. 
8.3.1  Data 
The Italian data source is a representative household survey collected by a 
private company for the Bank of Italy over the period 1978-87, excluding 1981 
and 1985; we refer to this data set as the BDI.*O For the United States, we use 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS). Several data limitations for the 
BDI require discussion. First, the earnings variable is annual earnings from 
employment net of taxes, which does not have an exact equivalent in the CPS; 
we use CPS annual gross wage and salary earnings.*' Schooling and age are 
not continuous in the BDI, but they are segmented into five and six categories, 
respectively (schooling categories: no schooling, completed elementary, com- 
pleted junior high, completed high school, and college or higher degree; age 
categories: under twenty-one, twenty-one  to thirty, thirty-one to forty, forty- 
one to fifty, fifty-one to sixty-five, and over sixty-five); for our comparative 
regressions, we similarly segment the CPS data, making the schooling catego- 
ries none = completed grade 0-5;  elementary = completed grade 6-8;  junior 
high = completed grade 9-11;  high school = completed grade  12-15;  and 
college+  = completed grade 16+. Note that the BDI does not contain infor- 
mation on the worker's inquadramento level. 
Finally, we restrict our samples to full-time, full-year nonagricultural work- 
ers between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five who are not self-employed. 
Earnings are not top coded in the BDI; we impute top-coded CPS annual earn- 
ings at 1.45 times the annual top-code amount (following Katz and Murphy 
1992). We conduct all our analyses separately for men and women.** 
8.3.2  Age and Educational Composition of the Labor Forces 
First, we examine the levels and changes of the age and occupational struc- 
tures in the two countries. Table 8.6 presents the sample proportions for the 
five schooling and five age categories in the two countries for men and women 
in 1978 and 1987. Note in particular the generally higher level of schooling in 
the United States and the rough similarity of the age distributions. From the 
beginning of this period to the end of this period, the proportion of Italian men 
20. These data were previously analyzed in Cannari, Pellegrini, and Sestito (1989) and Sestito 
(1990), who estimated earnings functions for Italy and examined the residual variance, concluding 
that there has been no significant increase in inequality. We  thank them for their insights and the 
Bank of Italy for providing the data. The survey was conducted in 1981, but the data in that year 
deviate from the adjacent years along enough dimensions to be highly suspect; we exclude it. No 
survey was conducted in 1985. 
21. We discuss the Italian tax system and its possible effects on earnings inequality below. 
22. The male/female earnings differential is greater in the United States than in Italy and is 
dropping faster in the United States. For an analysis of the gender earnings gap in Italy and else- 
where, we refer the reader to Blau and Kahn (chap. 3 in this volume). Table 8.6  Sample Percentages of Age and Education Categories, Italy and the 
United States, 1978 and 1987 
Women  Men 
1978  1987  1978  1987 
Education: Highest level 
completed 
None: 
Italy  4.0  1.2  3.0  1.2 
United States  2.2  1.3  1.2  .7 
Italy  31.0  21.3  24.0  14.0 
United States  1.7  4.5  5.5  2.7 
Italy  31.7  36.8  28.5  27.1 
United States  12.0  9.0  10.8  6.6 
Italy  25.2  30.0  33.8  40.8 
United States  56.0  57.8  64.9  66.0 
Italy  8.1  10.6  10.7  16.2 




College +  : 
Age category 
18-20: 
Italy  3.6  1.6  7.1  2.6 
United States  2.9  1.9  4.2  2.2 
Italy  23.5  21.0  34.9  21.7 
United States  27.3  27.3  31.7  30.4 
21-30: 
3 1-40: 
Italy  26.7  29.3  21.5  33.4 
United States  26.7  32.1  22.1  30.4 
Italy  23.5  27.5  21.0  25.1 
United States  21.2  21.0  20.4  20.7 
41-50: 
5 1-65 : 
Italy  22.8  20.6  9.5  11.2 
United States  21.9  17.8  21.7  16.2 
Experience 
Italy  25.7  25.3  19.9  20.9 
United States  22.0  20.7  21.2  19.8 
Sources: Bank of Italy, U.S. Current Population Survey. 
Note: For education and age categories, the number given is the percentage of the particular gen- 
der’s total sample of full-time, full-year nonagricultural workers who are not self-employed, aged 
18-65,  accounted  for by  particular category. Highest  level of  education  completed  in United 
States: none = completed grade 0-5,  elementary = 6-8,  junior high = 9-11,  high school = 12-15, 
college+  = 16+.  Experience = mean of age category minus years to completion of schooling 
category minus six. 287  Wage Differentials in Italy 
in this sample who had not completed high school fell  11 percent (from 66.7 
to 59.3 percent), while the proportion of  their American male counterparts who 
had not completed high school fell 32 percent (from 21.9 to 14.8 percent); the 
proportion of Italian men with college degrees rose 3 1 percent, and the propor- 
tion of American men with college degrees rose 24 percent. For Italian women, 
the proportion who had not completed high school fell 23 percent, and the 
proportion with college degrees rose 5 1 percent; the corresponding numbers 
for American women in the CPS sample are -43  percent and 36 percent. In 
both countries, then, there was a trend toward greater educational attainment 
among full-time workers over this period.23  We  return to these findings and 
their possible roles in explaining the trends in overall inequality. 
8.3.3  Educational Earnings Differentials 
We  now examine differences and changes in the return to human capital 
characteristics. Looking first at the raw evidence on the influence of schooling 
on earnings, significant cross-country differences appear to exist in education- 
earnings profiles. Table 8.7 presents raw (completed high school)/(did not com- 
plete high school) and (college degree)/(completed high school) average earn- 
ings ratios for men and women in each country for four age groups (combining 
the youngest two in table 8.6 above to create the eighteen to thirty category). 
Both ratios rise in every age-gender group from the beginning of the period to 
the end of the period among Americans, and the collegehigh school gap rises 
in all groups but one in Italy (men forty-one to fifty). Yet the high school/(less 
than high school gap was smaller in 1987 than in 1978 in six of the eight age- 
gender groups in Italy (except age thirty-one to forty for both men and women). 
By 1987, the ratios for Americans were greater than or equal to the correspond- 
ing ratios for Italians in every age-gender group. 
Differences also seem to exist in the shape of  the raw  education-earnings 
profiles. In  most cases, the collegehigh  school gap is greater than the high 
school/less than high school gap in the United States, but the opposite is often 
true in Italy, particularly among the older cohorts and in the later years. This 
suggests that education-earnings profiles tend to be convex in the United States 
and concave in Italy. 
23. We  can  use these five age and five schooling levels to create twenty-five age-schooling 
categories, the finest division possible for the Italian sample along the dimensions of schooling 
and experience. For Americans, both men and women in both  1978 and  1987, the largest age- 
education categories are always high school aged twenty-one to thirty and thirty-one to forty. The 
largest age-education categories in 1978 for Italian men were junior high aged twenty-one to thirty 
and elementary aged fifty-one to sixty-five and in  1987 junior high and high school aged thirty- 
one to forty. In  1978 the largest categories for Italian women were high school and junior high 
aged twenty-one to thirty and in 1987 high school aged twenty-one to thirty and thirty-one to forty 
(as in the United States). Apart from the generally higher level of schooling in the United States, 
the two countries look reasonably similar in terms of the distribution of age cohorts within school- 
ing categories, and all the distributions seem to be moving toward older and more educated popula- 
tions (although the share in  the oldest category, fifty-one to sixty-five, drops for everyone but 
Italian women). Table 8.7  FducatiodEarnings  Ratios by  Age Groups, Italy and the United 
States, 1978437 (excluding 1981 and 1985) 
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We investigate these education-earnings relations further by  comparing the 
coefficients from logarithmic earnings functions estimated separately for men 
and women  in the two countries. Tables 8.8 and 8.9 present the coefficients 
on experience (defined as the mean of  the age category occupied by a given 
observation minus the years to completion of the  schooling category minus 
six), experience squared, and three schooling levels (up to completed elemen- 
tary, completed junior high, and college degree plus; completed high school is 
the excluded category) for the years 1978-87 for men and women, respectively. 
There are several interesting results from these regressions.  First, judging 
by  the  adjusted R2’s, the  explanatory power for the regressions  are roughly 
comparable across the two countries within gender groups. Second, while the 
returns to high school as well as college are clearly rising for both men and 
women in the United States, the trend is much less clear in Italy-indicating, 
if anything, a weak trend toward lower returns to high school (relative to those 
with elementary or less in particular) and higher returns to 
Third, making within-gender comparisons across the two countries, in each 
period the returns to high school and college are higher and the experience- 
earnings profile steeper for American men than for Italian men (excepting the 
return to completing high school relative to completing junior high in  1982). 
While Italian women  begin  with steeper experience-earnings  profiles  and a 
greater earnings deficit at the lowest education category compared to American 
women, these relations are reversed by  the end of the period after the greater 
growth in returns to education and experience among American women (the 
return to a college degree is much greater for American women than for Italian 
women throughout, but the gap is larger at the end of the period). 
Finally, making within-country comparisons across the genders, American 
men and women have roughly similar returns to high school and college, while 
Italian women have a greater return to a high school degree than Italian men 
when the comparison group is elementary or less, and Italian men have a some- 
what greater return to college. 
8.3.4  Overall Earnings Inequality 
The trends in overall inequality are shown in table 8.10, which displays five 
measures of earnings inequality for men and women: the 90-10 log earnings 
differential, the 90-50 log earnings differential, the 50-  10 log earnings differen- 
tial, the standard deviation of log earnings, and the standard deviation of log 
earnings residuals from separate regressions by gender-year-country cells (i.e., 
the regressions presented in tables 8.8 and 8.9 above) as well as the standard 
deviation of log earnings for men in industry in Italy and manufacturing in the 
United States. In all cases but the 50-10 differential for women in the earlier 
24. Note the large jump in returns to college for men in  1983. This jump comes primarily 
from those employed in public administration; the return for those employed in industry actually 
falls slightly. Table 8.8  Earnings Function Coefficients for Men in Italy and the United States, 1978-87  (excluding 1981 and 1985) 
1978  1979  1980  1982  1983  1984  1986  1987 
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years, inequality is greater for Americans than for their Italian gender counter- 
parts. In all but one case, there is evidence of an increase in inequality in the 
United States and somewhat weaker evidence of a decrease in inequality in 
Italy-the  exception is the 90-50 log earnings differential for men in Italy, 
which increases steadily after 1979.25 
We do not have a conclusive explanation for the lack of  a U shape in Italian 
individual level inequality that we see in the aggregate sectoral data presented 
in the previous two sections. One possible explanation is that the composition 
of our sample of individuals may lead to results that do not reflect the changes 
in metal-manufacturing inter-inquadrumento inequality or the other measures 
of  interindustry and interoccupational inequality presented above. Less than 
50 percent of  the BDI sample (substantially less for women) is employed in 
industry, and, when we analyze this sector separately, we do find a rise in the 
standard deviation of  log earnings for men in  1987 to a level above that in 
1983,26  although it still drops from 1983 through 1986 (see the final column of 
table 8.10). Another possibility is that “industry” contains sectors that had a 
different experience than metal-manufacturing; unfortunately, we cannot sepa- 
rate out these other sectors in this data set. 
8.3.5  Possible Explanations for the Divergent Trends in Overall Inequality 
in Italy and the United States 
We  recognize that there are many conceivable explanations for these diver- 
gent results on the coefficients in the earnings functions and the dispersion of 
earnings in the two countries. These range from differences in technology (or 
the relation of earnings and productivity within individual firms), to differences 
in the imbalances between the supply of and the demand for skills (including 
the effect of the price of education on labor supply, college being virtually free 
in Italy), to the possibility of  different methods of non-price  rationing in the 
labor markets (including various types of  discrimination), to the changing in- 
fluence of taxes (which are netted from the Italian but not the U.S. data). 
We certainly cannot distinguish definitively among these alternatives at this 
point. Yet, because we find the difference in the trends of  inequality to be so 
striking, we close this section by examining some possible explanations for the 
movement toward rising inequality in the United States and stable to falling 
inequality in Italy, as displayed in table 8.10. An explanation that is logically 
possible involves the distribution of skills in the two countries: the results re- 
ported above might be consistent with a sharper trend toward higher educa- 
tional attainment among fully employed workers and thus toward greater over- 
25. This suggests that, for men, Italian labor market institutions may have succeeded in keeping 
up wages at the bottom but not in preventing substantial wage drift at the top. The same does not 
seem to be true for women. Note as well that the 90-50  differential is greater for Italian men than 
for Italian women, perhaps reflecting the greater returns to a college degree for men in Italy, while 
most other measures of inequality are greater for Italian women than for Italian men. 
26. The sample of women in industry is too small to be reliable. 296  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
all inequality in the United States. Recall, however, from the discussion above 
(table 8.6) that, while the average levels of  education are higher in the United 
States, the trends in educational attainment seem to be going in the same basic 
directions  in  the  two  countries-in  fact, the  proportion  of  fully  employed 
workers with college degrees or more has increased more sharply in Italy than 
in the United States for both men and women.27 
The findings on the trends in inequality could also be consistent with differ- 
ential changes in the occupational or industrial structures in the two countries. 
In fact, the share of blue-collar workers has been falling and the share of white- 
collar workers rising for both men and women in the Italian sample: the share 
of blue-collar workers among men fell from 59 percent in 1978 to 49 percent 
in  1986, while the share of white-collar workers rose from 41 to 51 percent; 
among women, the share of blue-collar  workers fell from 49 percent in 1978 
to 40 percent in 1986, and the share of  white-collar workers rose from 50 to 
60 percent.** As for the industrial distribution,  the category industry is the 
largest among men but has dropped over this period from 48 percent of the 
workers in 1978 to 39 percent in 1986, while the categories public administra- 
tion and the residual category have been growing. Among women, public ad- 
ministration has always been the largest category (rising from 33 percent of 
the  workers  in  1978 to 43 percent  in  1986) and  has also grown relative to 
industry; trade is the third  largest category among women,  as compared to 
transportation and communications among men.29 
Overall, then, there has been a shift away from blue-collar and industrial 
jobs and a shift toward white-collar and public administration jobs among both 
men and women in Italy over this period. The industry and occupation catego- 
ries are not strictly comparable with those in the CPS, so we do not present a 
direct comparison, but these results  suggest that Italy has been  undergoing 
a deindustrialization  similar to that experienced by other Western countries, 
indicating that the explanation for the divergence of  the trends in inequality 
will probably not be found here. 
Furthermore,  when  we calculate  the effects of between-industry  shifts in 
labor demand on the relative demands for different skill and gender groups in 
Italy (using the methodology of Katz and Murphy [  19921 and Katz, Loveman, 
and Blanchflower [chap. 1 in this volume], who find evidence of shifts toward 
more educated workers in the United States and elsewhere) on the basis of six 
industries and six gender-skill groups, we find a shift against workers with less 
than a high school degree, a slight shift in favor of workers who completed 
27. On the other hand, a given increase in the proportion of  college-educated workers might be 
expected to produce more overall inequality in the United States, given the generally higher returns 
to schooling. 
28. This is consistent with the findings for the metal-manufacturing sector presented in sec. 
8.2 above. 
29. Note that we  use  1986 for the ending date here because the industrial and occupational 
classification systems changed in 1987. 297  Wage Differentials in Italy 
high school, and a much greater shift toward workers with a college degree or 
more for both men and  We  conclude that the fall in returns to high 
school, the less than dramatic rise in the returns to college, and the drop in 
overall inequality in Italy are not due to between-industry shifts in labor de- 
mand away from more educated  worker^.^' 
The influence of  taxes, which are netted from the Italian but not from the 
U.S. data, is another candidate explanation for the observed trends in inequal- 
ity in Italy and the United States. The Italian tax system is effectively progres- 
sive because of both the structure of marginal tax rates and the lump-sum na- 
ture of  deductions. While before-tax earnings have  been found to be more 
unequal than after-tax earnings, the progressivity of  the tax system seems to 
have decreased between 1982 and 1987 (see Nardecchia and Patriarca 1992; 
Ricciardelli 1992; and Di Bella and Parisi 1992). This suggests that, while the 
influence of  taxes might contribute to the difference in the level of inequality 
in the two samples, it probably does not drive the difference in the trends; if 
anything, we would expect a bias toward increasing inequality in Italian after- 
tax earnings from the decreasing progressivity of the Italian tax structure over 
this period. 
One additional possibility that we  find appealing is that differences in the 
nature and evolution of labor market institutions in the two countries have con- 
tributed to the low and falling inequality in Italy and the high and rising in- 
equality in the United States-specifically,  labor market institutions (union 
contracts and relatively centralized bargaining structures, e.g.) act to narrow 
earnings inequality to a greater extent in Italy and have not been deregulated 
or otherwise dismantled to the extent that they have been in the United States. 
This final interpretation is consistent with the generally lower returns to a col- 
lege degree and the less steep experience-earnings profiles in Italy as well as 
the general thrust of the evidence provided in section 8.2 above on the metal- 
manufacturing sector. 
30. The six industries are industry, public administration, trade, public transport and communi- 
cation, banking, and other. The six gender-skill groups are did not complete high school, com- 
pleted high school, and college degree for men and women. We use 1978 as the base year and 
1986 as the ending year owing to the change in the occupational classification system in 1987. 
The value of the shift away from men who did not complete high school, as measured by the 
difference in the logarithms of the  indexes of relative demands from  1978 to 1986, is  -.132, 
toward men who completed high school ,095, toward men with a college degree ,158, away from 
women who did not complete high school -.003,  toward women who completed high school .172, 
and toward women with a college degree ,253. 
31. The evidence on the growth of education categories within industries is somewhat more 
mixed: while the share of  workers with a high school degree or above rises or remains stable 
between 1978 and 1986 in every industry except the residual other, the share with a college degree 
actually falls slightly in three industries: public administration, banking, and other. This suggests 
that there may not have been increases in the demand for skilled workers within these industries; 
keep in mind, however, that public administration and banking are both relatively politically con- 
trolled and that their hiring practices may therefore be driven by concerns other than the technolog- 
ical needs for skills (political patronage, e.g.). 298  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
8.4  Conclusions: Mechanisms outside the Regular Economy 
Influencing Overall Italian Wage Inequality 
The overall picture of  Italy presented in this paper is of  a country with a 
compressed wage structure that is not yet undergoing the rapid decompression 
experienced elsewhere during the 1980s. The decline of inter-inquadramento, 
interindustry, and blue-collar/white-collar differentials during the 1970s came 
to a stop and was slightly reversed during the 1980s, but these differentials did 
not rise back to pre-1980s levels despite the reforms of the mid-1980s. Over 
the period 1978-87,  measures of individual level earnings inequality indicate, 
if anything, a trend toward a less unequal distribution. This trend is in marked 
contrast to the experience in the United States, where inequality clearly in- 
creased during the 1980s. 
There seem to have been three important determinants of  this evolution of 
wage differentials in Italy over the last twenty years. First is the egalitarian 
ideology of Italian unions, which in times of union strength such as the 1970s 
led to the institutionalization of equalizing practices such as low contracted 
wage differentials and egalitarian escalator clauses. Second is the dynamic of 
injution in conjunction with the different escalator regimes that Italy has expe- 
rienced during this period. Third is the evolution of technology, productivity 
differentials, and related skill shortages in the labor markets, which most likely 
primarily influenced the individually contracted portion of total compensation. 
One might have expected that the clear break in the evolution of wage differ- 
entials around 1982-83  would have offered the chance to evaluate the relative 
importance of  these factors. However, the simultaneous nature of these pro- 
cesses makes such a task impossible with the available information: the years 
when  the compression of wage differentials  came to  a stop, or at least to a 
slowdown, were also the years in which major discontinuities occurred in the 
evolution of the three factors identified above: union strength, as measured by 
strike activity and by membership, significantly weakened; inflation, after the 
explosion  of  the  1970s, started  a downward trend that  lasted until  the  late 
1980s; and, finally, the process of industrial restructuring induced by the oil 
shocks and by the computer revolution likely caused changes in the demanded 
skill  composition  of  the  labor force,  not  necessarily  and  not  immediately 
matched by changes in the composition of supplies. 
Nevertheless,  the  evidence  provided  by  the  comparison  with  the  United 
States suggests that the continuing  compression in  the regular  sector likely 
cannot be attributed to market forces. Both countries appear to have experi- 
enced the sort of trend toward a more educated and more heavily white-collar 
workforce  that accompanies  deindustrialization.  In  addition, the  analysis of 
between-industry  labor demand  shifts provides no evidence of a shift away 
from more educated workers in either country. Despite these similar labor sup- 
ply and labor demand indicators, measured inequality has been relatively high 299  Wage Differentials in Italy 
and increasing in the United States and low and decreasing in Italy. Thus, there 
seems to be room enough for alternative explanations for the Italian case. 
It is difficult to deny that egalitarian institutions, and in particular the scala 
mobile, bore a large measure of responsibility for the wage compression of the 
1970s. We cannot say how much of that compression was actually expected in 
1975 when the scala mobile payments were first equalized across all workers; 
most likely, the probability of  many  years of inflation in double figures was 
underestimated at that time.)* Indeed, the fact that  contracted differentials 
started to increase in  1979, leaving indexation as the primary factor causing 
compression through 1983, suggests that unions might have realized that the 
compression was becoming excessive. Yet the 1975 system was not modified 
until 1983, and only in 1986 was its egalitarian nature substantially changed. 
The fact that it took so long to reform the scala mobile leads to the suspicion 
that the implied compression was not too far from what the market could bear. 
On the other hand, episodes like the march of the forty thousand in 1980 and 
the referendum against the scala mobile in 1985 suggest that the compression 
had already reached the threshold of  sustainability by  the early 1980s, and 
indeed in subsequent years the system was changed. 
Before the reform of the scala mobile, the individual superminimum was 
the escape valve through which the parties could make bearable the compres- 
sion caused by  inflation. One might even suspect that the disequalizing effect 
of the drift was part of  some kind of  implicit agreement between employers 
and unions to control the compression caused by unexpectedly high inflation. 
Unions might have been attached to the egalitarian scala mobile for internal 
political reasons, allowing the drift to correct for the unexpected effects. How- 
ever, we do not have evidence on the validity of these speculations, and, if they 
were true, one would be left with the question, Why wasn’t  the excessively 
egalitarian nature of  the escalator system reformed before the mid-1980s if 
even the majority within the unions may have been dissatisfied with it? 
Indeed, had the system been modified by giving more weight to contracted 
increases, as, for example, in Sweden (see Edin and Holmlund, chap. 9 in this 
volume), unions might have  acquired more control over wage determination 
and wage dispersion. But precisely the comparison with the Swedish experi- 
ence suggests that  the  instrument through  which  compression is  achieved 
(escalator in Italy, contracted increases in Sweden) is probably irrelevant: what 
matters is the extent to which compression can be imposed, and in both coun- 
tries the sustainable threshold was reached around the same period. 
32. Franc0 Mattei, one of the Confindustria experts who bargained the 1975 agreement, wrote 
afterward, “The compression effect of  the new  system was perceived, but it was considered as 
justified in the short period emergency [to protect low wages from the oil shock inflation]. Even 
myself, looking back at my notes, in November 1974 I did not expect that we would have had an 
inflation rate around 20% for so many years. I thought that we were at a peak of inflation but that 
inflation was soon going to be eliminated’ (Mattei 1981, 141). 300  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
Why, then, were employers unable to undo the compression? For employers, 
individual superminima were not a costless instrument for controlling wage 
compression: given the compensation increases granted by the contracts and 
by the scalu mobile to low inquadramento levels, larger superminima at high 
levels implied a greater growth in total labor costs. Therefore, the disequalizing 
potential of individual superminima was somewhat limited by constraints on 
total labor cost increases. These constraints were likely to have been particu- 
larly binding during the period of high inflation, and this might explain why 
the individual superminima did not fully offset the effect of the scula mobile 
before 1983. Yet the puzzle remains as to why wage inequality did not increase 
back to its levels of the early 1970s after inflation slowed down, particularly 
when technological changes probably required, if anything, a more marked 
trend toward larger compensation differentials across skills, as occurred in the 
United States and elsewhere. 
A credible partial explanation to this puzzle is that other remedies to wage 
compression, perhaps less costly to employers, seem to have proliferated in the 
nonregular areas of the economy, not covered by our empirical analysis above. 
For example, Italy is among the developed countries with the greatest levels 
and  highest  recent  growth  rates  of  self-employment:  nonagricultural  self- 
employment as a proportion of total civilian employment grew from 18.9 per- 
cent in 1979 to 22.3 percent in 1990 (OECD 1992).33  Italian self-employment 
may be a consequence of the presence of restrictive labor market regulations 
imposed by unions, in particular hiring and firing costs (Bertola 1990). It is 
also possible that the compression of wage differentials for non-self-employed 
workers might have spurred the diffusion of  self-employment:  some of  the 
highly skilled workers who saw their earnings limited by the egalitarian union 
policies may have offered themselves as freelancers (perhaps even to the same 
firms that were previously hiring them as employees) with the aim of getting 
better returns to their skills. Although we are not aware of any explicit quantita- 
tive evidence on this link between wage compression in the unionized sector 
and self-employment, it seems to be a credible hypothesis, consistent with an- 
ecdotal evidence. If this is the case, then the egalitarian efforts of unions have 
been  only partially  successful:  wages of  regular employees may  have been 
compressed, but an increasing number of workers could have avoided the com- 
pression by becoming self-employed. 
Italy is also well known for having a large underground economy, and, al- 
most by definition, the underground economy is something over which official 
33. As a point of comparison, the share of self-employed workers grew from 7.1 percent in 1979 
to 7.6 percent in 1990 in the United States. The United Kingdom seems to be the country with the 
greatest growth of the proportion of self-employed, from 6.6 percent in 1979 to 11.6 percent in 
1990. The share of self-employed workers in the complete Bank of  Italy survey rises from 17.5 
percent in 1978 to 23 percent in 1987; we do not use these observations for the wage inequality 
calculations in sec. 8.3 above because we have no way of distinguishing full-time self-employed 
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wage-setting institutions and unions have no legal control and minimal influ- 
ence. As in the case of self-employment, one is tempted to attribute the size of 
the underground economy to the existence of labor market and fiscal regulation 
that employers view as burdensome. Indeed, the available estimates of the un- 
derground economy for Italy are larger than most estimates for other Western 
countries, where labor market regulations are generally less restrictive (Dal- 
lago 1988, 1990).34  In line with this view, the compression of wage differentials 
in the unionized sector could be a stimulant for the underground economy: if 
some of the compression is achieved by  raising low wages (a hypothesized 
effect of  the scala mobile), it becomes difficult for employers to profitably 
maintain "overground" activities involving less skilled workers. Although hir- 
ing less skilled workers into underground activities not controlled by  unions 
may not be feasible for large companies, the reader should keep in mind that 
the Italian productive structure is constituted in large part by very small firms. 
Yet, in contrast to self-employment, it is difficult to find any reliable evi- 
dence of a significantly increasing trend in the underground economy in Italy 
in recent years. While the lack of reliability is no doubt in large part inherent 
in any attempt to measure underground activities, the official statistics that do 
exist (a revised series of Italian GNP from the central statistical office, ISTAT) 
show that the nonexplicitly measured portion of  national product went from 
15.3 percent in 1980 to 17.7 percent in 1985 and then slightly decreased to 16 
percent in 1986 (Dallago 1988, 73-75).35 It thus seems more difficult than in 
the situation of self-employment to build a prima facie case for a link between 
the trend in the compression of wage differentials and possible diffusion of the 
underground economy. 
Another manner in which a de facto wider wage distribution may have been 
achieved despite the compression  documented above involves the so called 
contratti di formazione e lavoro: special labor contracts for workers between 
fourteen and twenty-nine years of age. Permanently introduced by law in 1984 
after several previous experiments, they require employers to provide some 
training in return for lower wages and social contributions. In contrast to stan- 
dard jobs, the contracts are temporary (twenty-four months); at the expiration 
of the contract, the employer can decide whether to hire the worker for a life- 
time position without having to consider other unemployment queues, and fi- 
nancial incentives for transitions into permanent contracts are provided by the 
government. The number of young workers hired under these contracts grew 
from 10,694 in 1984 to 529,297 in 1989. The biggest jump was between 1986 
34. Dallago (1988) reports that recent estimates of the Italian underground GDP as a proportion 
of total GDP range from 6 to 30.1 percent, with most estimates in double figures. For the United 
States, the analogous estimates range from 2.6 to 33 percent, with very few estimates in double 
figures. For further discussion of the Italian underground economy, see also Deaglio (1984) and 
Rey (1985). 
35. Note, however, that only a part of this change can be attributed to the actual growth of  the 
underground economy; the rest is due to a revision in statistical techniques. 302  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
and  1987, when the number of  hirings grew from 229,126 to 402,586; this 
jump was influenced  by a modification  to the law providing  employers with 
larger wage and social contribution savings. The number of  new contrutti di 
formazione  e  lavoro has  started  to  decline  slightly  only recently,  down  to 
469,050 in  1990?  The available data indicate that approximately 50 percent 
of these contracts (40 percent in the south) are eventually  transformed  into 
permanent contracts (Minister0 del Lavoro 1988-91). 
The popularity of these contracts among both young workers and employers 
is consistent with the view that a less compressed wage distribution is wel- 
comed by both groups (possibly at the expense of unemployed older workers, 
who would have to be hired under standard permanent contracts), particularly 
given the often-stated charge that these employment relationships do not really 
serve their official function of providing young workers with meaningful spe- 
cial training. From the employers’ point of view, the advantages are fairly obvi- 
ous, but these contracts are likely to represent a desirable alternative to unem- 
ployment  or  to  employment  in  the  underground  economy  for  the  young 
workers as well. Youth unemployment has been relatively high in Italy in re- 
cent years: the percentage of  total unemployment constituted by job seekers 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four fluctuated around 61-62  percent 
between  1978 and 1983, declining thereafter to 54 percent in  1987 and to 48 
percent in 1990 (OECD 1978-90).  Most likely, many of these young workers 
have been finding jobs in the underground economy. But, even if the amount 
of underground employment hidden in the official youth unemployment figures 
is significant,  the basic  conclusion  that we draw  from this  evidence is un- 
changed: it seems that, by imposing their egalitarian aspirations on the regular 
sector of the economy, Italian unions may have ended up limiting the size of 
this sector. 
The evidence that we present in the first three sections of this paper indicates 
that wage differentials have indeed been compressed in the regular sector of 
the economy. Yet this concluding section suggests that this very compression 
may well have contributed to the flight away from the regular sector at both 
ends of the skill distribution: highly skilled workers may have left to seek the 
unrestricted  returns to self-employment, while less skilled entrants were in- 
duced to accept lower-paying  training  contracts, were  forced into the  more 
precarious  underground  economy,  or remained  unemployed.  These mecha- 
nisms may well, in turn, have contributed to a greater overall degree of inequal- 
ity than is apparent in our analysis of wage differentials in the regular sector 
of the Italian economy. 
36. This amounts to approximately 3 percent of  the total nonagricultural paid workforce. 303  Wage Differentials in Italy 
Data Appendix 
Assolombarda 
Assolombarda is the association of private employers in the Lombardy re- 
gion. The data set is based on a survey of  the associated firms in the Milan 
area. The survey has been taken in October and April of each year since 1976, 
but not all the surveys are available, particularly at the beginning of the sample. 
For each firm and inquadramento-level cell, the survey provides the average of 
each compensation component received by the workers in that cell; individual 
firms cannot be identified, however. In  1988, there was a change in the design 
of  the survey, but, for the metal-manufacturing sector (the one we  analyze), 
previous data have been readjusted by Assolombarda to ensure comparability 
across years. We  are, however, less than fully confident about the consistency 
of these readjustments since some apparent discontinuities have not been elim- 
inated; therefore, we use cross-time comparisons in this data set only when the 
regularity of the data seems acceptable. 
We have access to firm-level information only for the October surveys from 
1983 through  1990. For the other years we  rely on the published averages 
across firms for each inquadrumento level. 
Bank of Italy 
The Bank of Italy survey of Italian households was first collected in 1977. 
The survey was not conducted in 1985, and the data for 1981 are not consid- 
ered to be sufficiently representative by the experts at the bank. After 1987, the 
survey has been conducted biannually. 
Data are collected on a representative cross section of Italian households by 
a private company for the Bank of Italy. The survey has been mainly designed 
to provide information on consumption and savings behavior; therefore, the 
information available for the estimation of earnings functions, and in general 
the information available for labor market research, is somewhat limited. 
See also Bank of Italy, “I bilanci delle famiglie Italiane,” in Supplementi ul 
bollettino statistico: Note metodologiche  e informazione statistiche (various 
years), and “Le indagini campionarie sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane,” Con- 
tributi ull’analisi economica (special issue, 1986). 
Federmeccanica 
Federmeccanica is the national association of  private metal-manufacturing 
firms. This data set is based on a sample of the associated firms and provides, 
for each inquadrumento level, the cross-firm average total monthly compensa- 
tion and the cross-firm average contractual plus scalu mobile compensation. It 
also provides the proportion of workers in each inquadramento level. Data are 
available from 1976 through 1990. 304  Christopher L. Erickson and Andrea C. Ichino 
Ministry of Labor 
This data set is based on a survey of eleven thousand plants and is sponsored 
by the Ministry of Labor. Until 1977,  only firms with more than five employees 
were included. After 1977, the survey is limited to firms with more than fifty 
employees. 
The data used in figure 8.1 above is the average hourly blue-collar and train- 
ees’ compensation, computed as the total monthly base compensation paid to 
these workers divided by the total number of  hours. The series was discon- 
tinued in 1985. A  new series was started in 1986, but the data are not yet 
available. 
National Accounts 
We have used the new series (1970-89)  of the national accounts data pub- 
lished by  ISTAT  (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Rome), in Collana di in- 
formazione, vol. 10 (1990). 
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